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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. L. BEARD, ELDON L. SUTHER--
LAND, and VERNON LEHR 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
WHITE, GREEN and ADDISON AS-
SOCIATES, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
E. B. YAKES 
Defendant and Respondent., 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Case 
No. 8865 
This appeal is taken from the order of the Trial 
Court denying the motion of White, Green and Addison 
Associates, Inc., to Quash Officer's Return of Process 
and to set Aside Decree and Writ of Possession. Plain-
tiffs had commenced in the District Court of San Juan 
County, Utah, an action for eviction and to quiet title 
to certain mining claims. Process was served at Denver, 
Colorado, on October 2, 1956, on a Richard J erris, alleged 
to be the field manager and agent of Defendant, vVhite, 
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. A default was en-
tered by the Clerk of the Court on the 31st of October, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
1.956, no answer or other pleading having been filed by 
Defendant, White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc. 
On March 18, 1957, Defendant, White, Green and Addi-
son Associates, Inc., was allegedly served with an 
Answer and a Cross-complaint wherein Defendant, E. 
B. Yakes, asked that the lease of White, Green and Addi-
son Associates, Inc. be cancelled and that title to certain 
mining claims be quieted as against VVhite, Green and 
Addison Associates, Inc. 
The original return of service was amended to 
specify the particular papers served. On April16, 1957, 
the Clerk of the Court, upon the request of the Defend-
ant, E. B. Yakes, entered a default against White, Green 
and Addison Associates, Inc. on the Cross-complaint 
and on the same date, the Court signed a Decree reciting 
the default of Defendant, \vllite, Green and Addison 
.\.ssociates, Inc., cancelling the lease of said Defendant on 
certain 1nining clalins and quieting title in the mining 
rlaims in Defendant, E. B. Yakes. On July 29, 1957, De-
fendant, \Yitite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., 
moved to quash the officers~ returns of serYice of process 
dated October :.!, 1956, and ~larch 19, 1951. and further 
JJIOYPd to set a~ide the Decree and \Yrit of Possession 
l'111 pred b~· the Trial Court April16. 1951. On September 
:2.), I !l:>l, Defendant, \Yhite, Green and Addison ~\ssoci­
a tl'~, lne., filed an ~\n~wer to Plaintiffs C01nplaint and a 
Proposed .Answer to the Cross-c01nplaint of Defendant, 
]~. B. Yakes. Plaintiffs and Defendant, E. B. Yakes, 
~<'rV<'d notice on counsel for \\~hite, Green and Addison 
.. -\~~oeiatPs, Jne., that on Nove1nber I. 1D51. at the hearing 
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on the Defendant's Motion to Quash Return of Service 
of Process and to Set Aside Decree and Writ of Posses-
sion, they would request the Court for leave to amend 
the returns and proofs of service of process and for an 
order permitting the amended returns of service of pro-
cess to be filed in the action nunc pro tunc as of the 
date of the original returns. Following the hearing which 
had been continued to December 10, 1957, the Court 
denied the Defendant's motions. The Court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the 
filing of another amended return of service of process. 
Defendant's motion to set aside the findings of fact and 
<'onclusions of law was denied February 18, 1958. 
At the hearing the parties stipulated that White, 
Green and Addison Associates, Inc., was a foreign corpo-
ration not qualified to do business within the state of 
Utah (Tr. 6). Attorney William Ela of Grand Junction, 
Colorado, then testified that he accompanied Deputy 
Sheriff R. D. McAllister of San Juan County on March 18, 
1957 to the Hop Creek area where the purported service 
of summons was made on the Defendant. Upon arriving 
at the Hop Creek area, Sheriff McAllister took two copies 
of the summons and two copies of the answer and Cross-
complaint together with the attached exhibits and put a 
rubber stamp on them to show who was making the 
service, the date of service and his title (Tr. 7). The 
attorney testified that they had never been able to serve 
the Defendant in Denver, Colorado, ( Tr. 10), although 
an effort had been made (Tr. 8); that he had discovered 
the corporation had no process agent in the state of 
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Utah (Tr. 11). The attorney testified he took a photo-
graph on a prior occasion of a sign posted at the entrance 
to the li:op Creek property identifying it as being worked 
by White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc. and that 
he saw the same sign on ~larch 18, 1957 ( Tr. 13). He 
testified to a conversation in the presence of the Deputy 
Sheriff and the jeep driver with a man named Bottomley, 
which gentleman wore a badge on his hat identifying 
himself with Defendant, White, Green and Addison As-
sociates, Inc. ( Tr. 15). The Sheriff first handed the 
papers to :.Mr. Bottomley and Ela stated that he asked 
Bottomley what his name was and he identified himself. 
Bottomley ·was then asked if he was in charge of the 
property and he replied he was the foreman. He was 
asked whether he worked for White, Green and Addison 
Associates, Inc., and he replied that he did. He \Ya:3 
asked if there was any person of higher authority than 
hi1nself in charge of the property to which he answered 
that there \Yas not. He was asked from whom he received 
his pay checks and he answered that he received them 
from the Trans \Y orld Mining Corporation, but was 
allegedly confused about whether there \Yas one or two 
<'orporations (Tr. 16). At this tune the attorney took a 
picture of a sign on a trailer identifying it as being 
the property of \Yhih\ Green and .. A .. ddison ~\ssociates. 
In e ... .:\ t torney Ela stated he asked Bottmnley what he 
and the other 1nen were doing in the way of work and 
BottomlPy said that eyerything was going yery satis-
l'a<'torilY to him, but that if he wanted anY detailed 
. . 
i7J"I'onnation, he would have to get it frmn the officers 
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of the corporation in the Boston Building in Denver 
(Tr. 17). 
On cross-examination, the attorney stated that in 
October of 1956, he had been on the same property 
and found there present a man who identified himself 
as Miller who stated that he was foreman (Tr. 18). The 
attorney had made this trip to determine whether White, 
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. was still in posses-
sion of the mining claims and to see what the status 
of their workings were on the ground. The attorney 
denied that he had seen Miller on the property in March 
of 1957 (Tr. 20), although he admitted that Miller could 
have been one of the men in the group of workmen. The 
attorney did not inquire of Bottomley as to the where-
abouts of Mr. Miller (Tr. 22) nor did he inquire of 
Bottomley as to where he obtained his authority. The 
attorney stated that Bottomley appeared to be confused 
as to the distinction between White, Green and Addison 
Associates, Inc. and another corporation, Trans World 
Mining Corporation (Tr. 22). 
Deputy Sheriff Raymond McAllister first testified 
that he was unable to recall clearly any conversation 
except when Mr. Bottomley didn't want Mr. Ela to take 
a picture of the trailer on the property (Tr. 25). When 
prompted by his counsel (Tr. 26), the Deputy Sheriff 
was able to recall that Mr. Bottomley told Mr. Ela that 
he was foreman for both White ,Green and Addison As-
sociates, Inc. and Trans World Mining Corporation. On 
cross-examination the Deputy Sheriff testified that in 
July of 1956 he was on the same property at which time 
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he was informed that a 1\ir. H_ank Miller was superin-
tendent (Tr. 27). l-Ie stated that he did not know prior 
to March 18, 1957 that Bottomley was foreman of the 
property (Tr. 28) and had no knowledge as to Bot-
tomley's capacity with the Defendant company prior to 
that date; that he did not ask whether any officer or 
other agent was present other than Bottomley because 
it didn't matter much to him (Tr. 29), nor did he ask 
Bottomley where he got his authority; that he heard 
Bottomley state that he was foreman for both outfits 
in answer to Mr. Ela's question; that he could not recall 
on March 18, 1957 whether he asked of the whereabouts 
of :Jir. niiller, but believed that he did not (Tr. 30). 
Attorney F. Bennion Redd testified that he was con-
sulted by ~Ir. Miles White, an officer of the Defendant, 
White, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., and asked 
to settle two law suits by paying certain claims (Tr. 36). 
An attempt had previously been made to show that the 
papers in the two law suits had been served on ~Ir. 
Bottmnley (Tr. 33), but the testiinony to this effect was 
objected to and the objection sustained by the Court 
(Tr. 33). On cross examination Mr. Redd stated that 
he had never entered an appearance in either case on 
behalf of \ Yh i te, Green and .L-\ddison ~lssociates, Inc. 
( Tr. ;~s), nor discussed with his client. agency or the 
authoritY of the person seiTed in the 1natter. He stated 
he did not know who was served in the 1natter. 
Defendant called Mr. Carl J. Bott01nley who testi-
l'iPd that on the occasion when :J[r. Ela and Deputy 
Nlu•ril'f l\lcAlli8ter eame to llop Creek he was present 
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in camp with three other employees (Tr. 41) and that 
he recalled the deputy stating that he had some papers 
for him. He recalled receiving the papers and the subse-
quent conversations respecting the taking of a picture 
of the trailer, but could recall no conversation with Mr. 
Ela respecting the papers (Tr. 41). He stated that he 
stuck the papers in a suit case and forgot about then1 
(Tr. 41). He stated that his job on :March 18, 195'1 was 
that of handyman or general laborer (Tr. 42); that J.Vlr. 
Hank Miller was supervisor at the camp and that he did 
what Mr. Miller told him to; that Mr. Miller was his 
boss. He stated he had no conversation with Mr. Miller 
respecting the receipt of the papers nor with any officer 
of the company (Tr. 42). He stated that he was employed 
by vVhite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., in August 
of 1956, but that he was never employed by Trans World 
Mining Corporation. He stated that when he was sent 
to Hop Creek from Denver, he was informed that Mr. 
Miller would be superintendent of the camp (Tr. 43). 
He stated that he notified no one concerning the papers 
served upon him, but a month prior to the hearing while 
unpacking at another camp, he found them (Tr. 44). 
He stated that he had never been involved in Court pro-
ceedings and didn't think the papers were important 
('Tr. 45). He denied that he had told Mr. Ela he was 
foreman of the camp and stated he had never represented 
to the Sheriff that he was foreman (Tr. 45); that he 
was never left in charge of the camp (Tr. 46). 
On cross-examination :Mr. Bottomley stated that 
Hank Miller had left camp the night before March 18, 
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1957 (Tr. 48), and that he didn't know where he was 
going. Bottomley again denied that he told ~Ir. Ela that 
he was in charge of the camp on that date (Tr. 48); that 
he was engaged in cooking on the date the process was 
served. l-Ie stated that he saw 1:Iiller a couple of days 
after March 18th, but that he didn't tell ~Iiller about 
the service of papers because he didn't think it was 
important (Tr. 51). He stated he had been served with 
papers three or four times and that all the papers given 
to him he had kept in his suit case until about a month 
before the hearing (Tr. 52). He did not lmow how \Yhite, 
U reen and Addison Associates, Inc. had found out about 
other law suits. He stated that his authority was only 
that of a common laborer (Tr. 5±) even though he had 
told :\Ir. Ela to get off the property; he explained that 
the men understood that nobody was to trespass (Tr. 
3-t). He stated that in January he was on the property 
when the Sheriff made an attachn1ent of certain personal 
property (Tr. 57). 
On re-direct examination ~lr. Bottmnley testified 
that on no occasion did he recall the Sheriff asking 
whether he was fore1nan or in charge of the camp, and 
that at all tiines while he was there he received his 
in~trudions frmn ~lr. ~[iller (Tr. 38). On re-cross exam-
ination, ~~ r. Bott01nley stated that he believed at one time 
he told t ht> Sheriff that he couldn't accept papers then 
~('1'\'Pd on hhn lweanse he didn't haY(:"' any responsibility 
(Tr. f>!)). 
1\1 r. II Pll ry 1\1 illt"'r. called by Defendant, testified that 
h(' had ht>t>n e1nployed by \Yhitf•. Green and Addison 
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Associates, Inc. for about 18 months on the Hop Creek 
property and was property superintendent (Tr. 60); 
that in March of 1957, he was living at the Hop Creek 
property and that he left the camp for periods of a day 
or two at a time to attend meetings ( Tr. 62) ; that in 
July of 1956 he had a conversation with Sheriff Seth 
Wright in which he told the Sheriff he was in charge 
of the property at Hop Creek (Tr. 64); that a similar 
conversation occurred in the presence of Deputy Mc-
Allister (Tr. 64) ; that he was appointed superintendent 
of the property by Miles White; that he never at any 
time had a conversation with Mr. Bottomley regarding 
the receipt of any papers (Tr. 65); that as general super-
intendent he kept reports and saw that the rnen got the 
work done (Tr. 67); that he first learned of this law 
suit in June of 1957 when Sheriff Seth Wright said he 
was going to come out and throw them off the property 
in ten days (Tr. 67). 
Mr. Miles White, called by Defendant, testified that 
he was president of White, Green and Addison Associ-
ates, Inc., ( Tr. 68) ; that he hired Bottomley as a general 
laborer in Denver, ·Colorado, approximately a year and a 
half prior to the hearing; that Bottomley never held any 
other position with the company than general laborer (Tr. 
69); that Bottomley was instructed upon his being hired 
that he would be placed in a camp under a foreman 
or superintendent and that he would follow that man's 
instructions explicitly (Tr. 70); that Henry Miller was 
placed in charge of the Hop Creek camp about the 1st 
of July, 1956, and had remained in charge of the camp 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
from that date until the hearing; that he first had 
knowledge of the commencement of this action about 
August 1, 1957 (Tr. 72); that J\!Ir. Bottomley never 
informed him that an action had been commenced, nor 
did Mr. Miller inform him of the action (Tr. 73); that 
he was informed of the commencement of the action 
by an attorney in Denver, Colorado; that he then con-
tacted Utah counsel with respect to handling the matter. 
~Ir. White testified to a conversation July 1st or 2nd, 
1956, at the Hop Creek Camp at which Sheriff Setl1 
Wright and some state police and the camp crew were 
present and at that time Mr. Henry Miller had been 
introduced to the sheriff as camp superintendent (Tr. 
75). 
On cross examination, ~Ir. White testified that 
\Yhite, Green and Addison Associates, Inc., was a Colo-
rado corporation and that the company had an office at 
:n1 Boston Building in Denver, Colorado (Tr. 79). When 
questioned concerning receipt of a letter dated October 
19, 1957, he stated it had not been received (Tr. 80). 
He stated that the first notice he received of an attach-
Inent of certain property by the sheriff of San Juan 
Count~· was when he telephoned the c01npany's creditor 
to pa~· tlw obligation (Tr. 8~): that he did not call 
I>Ppll t ~· ~ltt>ri ff ~I c . :\ 11 i~h'r regarding the attaclunent 
within twPnty-fonr hours of that eYPnt (Tr. S~)): that 
:\I r .. \ddison. his as~oeiah.'. did not telephone the sheriff's 
ol'l'i<'<' or Jw would haYt' known of it; that :Jir. Green 
was not <'Olls<'ions of thr· matter at all. ::\Ir. 'Yhite then 
<rasP the' naml's and addresses of the officers of the 
t"l 
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company and stated that his first inkling of this law suit 
was in July or August of 1957 while passing through 
Monticello (Tr. 86); that Henry Miller had advised him 
that the Sheriff was going to evict the company frmn 
the Hop Creek property within ten days; that it was on 
that occasion that an attorney was contacted. 
Mr. White was asked on re-direct examination con-
cerning the residence of Mr. Jervis, the party served with 
the original Complaint in this matter by Plaintiffs. He 
testified that Mr. Jervis was employed by the Defendant 
company as a general laborer (Tr. 89), and that the 
address where service was purportedly made, 3256 
vVyandotte Street, Denver, Colorado, was the residence 
of one Jack Hennessey, another employee; that em-
ployees of the company in the field would stay at ~Ir. 
Hennessey's home when in Denver (Tr. 90); that the 
first conversation he had had with Mr. Jervis regarding 
service of papers was that morning (December 10, 1957) ; 
that Mr. Jervis had never contacted him or his company 
regarding this action prior to that time; that Jervis 
never gave him any papers served upon Jervis in this 
action (Tr. 91). On re-cross examination White stated 
that 3256 Wyandotte Street in Denver was a residential 
building. 
Mr. Richard Malcolm Jervis then testified that during 
the month of October, 1956, he was employed by De-
fendant company; that he was at 3256 Wyandotte Street 
in Denver during October 1956 when an attempt to 
serve some papers was made on him (Tr. 93); that a 
fellow knocked on the door and asked him who he was ; 
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that he told him his name and in turn asked him who 
he was, and he produced credentials from the sheriff's 
office; that the officer asked Jervis if he worked for 
White, Green and Addison, and Jervis answered that 
he did; that the officer had papers in his hand and said 
"I-I ere" ; that Jervis answered '"I'm sorry, I can't take 
those"; that the officer asked, '" \Vhy not:"; that Jervis 
answered, "I don't want to risk my job. I have no 
authority to accept papers or whatever you have there'' 
(Tr. 94); that the officer 'vent on to explain that the 
papers were legal process and that Jervis was authorized 
to take the~n; that the officer hit him in the chest with 
the papers while he was standing at his normal stance; 
that the papers dropped to the front porch; that Jervis 
stated he wasn't going to pick them up and the officer 
stated, "It doesn't make any difference to me. They have 
been served, you can leave them there"; that the officer 
then walked off the porch and Jervis walked back into 
the residence; that he never picked the papers up; that 
he told Hennessey what had happened, at the same time 
going out the back exit of the residence to n1eet a 
party he was expecting, that he had seen neither :Jir. 
Addison or ::\Ir. \Yhite, the only officers of the corpora-
tion he knew, sinee the previous smn1ner; that he in-
formed no one of the serYire of the papers except :Jir. 
II pnnP~~PY at that thne: that he did not know \Yhat the 
papPr~ "·prp: that he had nf'YC'r held any position with 
the <·ompan~· other than general laborer (Tr. 96). 
l\1 r. l\1 e ~\ 11 i~h'r, called by Plaintiff as a rebuttal 
witness, testified that after the attaclunent of the 
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property on Hop Creek he received a telephone call 
within the next day (Tr. 97). 
Cpon the foregoing testimony the Trial Court up-
held the validity of service of process by Cross-com-
plainant, E. B. Yakes, upon vVhite, Green and Addison 
Associates, Inc., by virtue of the delivery of papers 
by Deputy Sheriff R. D. McAllister to Carl J. Bottomley 
at Hop Creek, La Sal, Utah, specifically finding that 
Bottomley was foreman in charge of all of the White, 
Green and Addison Associates, Inc. properties in the 
Hop Creek area and that there was no person of higher 
authority in the employ of White, Green and Addison 
Associates, Inc. upon whom service could be had in 
San Juan County, nor in the state of Utah at the time 
of such service. Findings were also made that the De-
fendant corporation was doing business within the state 
of Utah without qualifying and that there was no officer, 
managing or general agent, or other agent authorized 
by appointment or law to receive service of process, and 
that since no such officer or agent was found in San 
Juan County, Utah, by the Sheriff after diligent search 
that service upon Bottomley as an agent having the 
management, direction and control of the properties of 
·said corporation was a sufficient compliance with the 
provisions of Rule 4 (e) (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Court further found that actual knowledge of 
the service of process upon Bottomley reached the De-
fendant corporation in sufficient time to allow the 
Defendant to properly protect itself before the Court 
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and that actual knowledge of the pendency of the action 
was received by the corporation as a result of service 
of process by the Sheriff of the City and County of 
Denver, Colorado, upon Richard Jervis even though said 
service was not essential to the determination of the 
issue before the Court; that the amended return of 
service signed by Seth F. Wright, Sheriff of San Juan 
County, should be filed, nunc pro tunc, as of the date 
of the filing of the original return of service so that the 
return of service might "speak the truth" as to the service 
made upon the Defendant. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court ordered that the Defendant's :.Jiotion 
to Quash Service of Process and to Set Aside Decree 
and Writ of Possession be denied and that the amended 
return of service dated ~farch 19, 1957, be ordered filed 
nunc pro tunc as of the date of the filing of the original 
return of service. The Court made no findings or order 
with respect to the ~lotion to Quash the Service of 
Plaintiff's Complaint on Richard Jervis. 
STATE!\IENTS OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND 
SET ASIDE DECREE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION AS TO 
THE ·CROSS-COMPLAINT, SINCE THE FINDINGS WERE 
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OR 
WERE MANIFESTLY CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED BY 
ERROR OF LAW. 
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POINT II. 
ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO MAKE FINDINGS 
AND ENTER ITS ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT COMPANY AND 
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND 
SET ASIDE DECREE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION AS TO 
THE ·CROSS-COMPLAINT, SINCE THE FINDINGS WERE 
WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OR 
WERE MANIFESTLY CONTROLLED OR INFLUENCED BY 
ERROR OF LAW. 
It has been stated by good authority that a Supreme 
Court cannot, in a law case, review the findings of the 
trial judge on the question of the existence of an agency 
which will sustain a service of process unless they were 
wholly unsupported by the evidence, or were manifestly 
controlled or influenced by error of law. Bass v. 
Ameri·can Products Export & Import Corp., 30 ALR 168, 
124 S.C. 346, 117 S.E. 594. It will be our purpose in this 
argument to show that the findings of the trial court 
in this case were based upon incompetent evidence or 
manifestly controlled or influenced by error of law. 
General principles with respect to service upon an 
agent by implication of law are set out by the text 
writer at 30 ALR 176. It is noted that in dealing with 
service of process on an agent, especially in case the 
process is directed against a foreign corporation, the 
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Court is confronted with the question whether due pro-
cess of law is being allowed to the party Defendant; 
for, as the service of process goes to the jurisdiction 
of the Court over the person, the word "'agent", as 
·used in the statute authorizing service of process on 
agents of foreign corporations, must be so construed 
as to conform with principals of natural justice, so 
that the service will constitute due process of law. 
In cases discussing the sufficiency of service of 
process on a person in the employment of the party 
named in the writ, the Courts have, in general, taken 
the view that the agent must be one whose connection 
with the company is such, or whose employment is of such 
character, that it would be implied that he had authority 
to receive service of process, and would be likely to 
infonn the party of the service. 
The United States Supreme Court has said that in 
the absence of any express authority given to a person to 
receive service of process on behalf of a foreign corpora-
tion, the question as to whether the service upon such 
person is sufficient service upon the corporation depends 
upon a review of the surrounding facts, and upon the 
inferences which the Court n1ight properly draw there-
froin; and if it appears that there is a law of the 
state in respect to the service of process on foreign 
corporations and that the character of the agency is 
such as to render it fair, reasonable, and just to imply 
an authority on the part of the agent to receive such 
service, the law will and ought to draw such inference 
and imply such authority, and service under such cir-
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cmnstances upon a person of that character would be 
sufficient. Conn. Mutual Life Insurance Company v. 
Spratley (1899) 172 U.S. 602, 43 L. Ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. 
308. As stated at 42 Am. Jur. Process Sec. 10'7, pg. 93, 
''The fundamental object of all laws relating to service 
of process is to give that notice which will, in the nature 
of things, most likely bring the attention of the corpor-
ation to the commencement of proceedings against it." 
The <1uestion, then, in this case is whether the 
character of the agent served was such as to imply an 
authority on his part to receive service on behalf of 
the corporation, or, more precisely, was Botton1ley an 
agent within the 1neaning of Rule -1: (e) (4) l:tah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which states in part, "If no such 
officer or agent can be found in the county in which 
the action is brought, then (service may be had) upon 
any such officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing 
agent, chief clerk or other agent having the manage-
ment, direction or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership, or other unincorporated 
association within the state". At 18 Fletcher on Corp-
orations, Sec. 8737, it is stated, "What persons come 
'Within the meaning of the term 'agent' has been the 
subject of much discussion. However, the word 'agent' 
in a statute authorizing service of process on an agent 
of a foreign corporation does not mean every man who 
is entrusted with a commission or employment, but 
designates the principal officers of the corporation who 
either generally or in respect to some particular de-
partment of the corporate business have a controlling 
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authority either general or special.*** He must be its 
representative within the jurisdiction, either as acting 
therein on its behalf by its authority, or as expressly 
or impliedly authorized by it to receive service.*** In 
other words, the 'other agent' must possess some of the 
powers possessed by the persons named immediately 
}Jreceding the phrase, 'or other agent'". In short, the 
rule of ejusdem generis should be applied to a statute 
such has been enacted in Utah and the words ""or other 
agent having the management, direction or control of 
any property of such corporation, partnership, or other 
unincorporated association within the state", should be 
construed in the light of the phrases immediately pre-
ceding. 
As will be noted, the rule names as a superior class 
upon whom service can be made, an "officer, a managing 
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process'~. 
The inferior class is then listed as follows, '•If no such 
officer or agent can be found in the county in which 
the action is brought, then upon any such officer or 
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk 
or other agent having the n1anagen1ent direction or 
control of any property of such corporation, partner-
ship, or other unincorporated association within the 
state". The use of the word "such" in the rule would 
seem to clearly refer the reader back to the general 
tenor of the preceding sentence and require that the 
person ~PrvPd have son1e of the characteristics of the 
general or 1nanaging agent. 
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The Utah Rule on service of process on corpora-
tions is unlike the Federal Rule in that the Federal 
Rule does not contain the portion of the rule upon which 
service in this case is founded. We are thus unable to 
refer to federal cases which have construed the portion 
of the rule in question. In Boston Acme Mines Develop-
ment Company v. Clawson, 66 Utah 103, 240 Pac. 165, 
the Supreme Court of this state had occasion to construe 
the statute in effect at that time which provided that 
service of a foreign corporation must be made on the 
"president, secretary, treasurer or other officer thereof 
or on the person designated by such corporation as one 
upon whom process may be served." If no such person 
could be found, "then upon any clerk, superintendent, 
general agent, cashier, principal director, ticket agent, 
station keeper, or other agent having the management, 
direction or control of any property of such corporation, 
company or association." In that case, the sheriff served 
an inferior agent of the Boston Acme Mines Develop-
ment Company, a Mr. M. K. Heavner, and the Defendant 
challenged the sufficiency of the service, first, on the 
ground that the return did not show what kind of an 
agent Heavner was, and second, even if he were agent 
upon whom service could be made, such service could 
not have been made until efforts had been diligently 
made to find and serve the president, the secretary, 
treasurer or other person of the superior class named 
in the statute. The Court sustained the defendant and 
held the agent upon whom service was made must be 
such as is named in the statute; otherwise, the service 
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is insufficient. In a later case, Reader v. District Court, 
98 Utah 1, 94 P. 2nd 858, the secretary of a corpora-
tion was served by delivering a copy of the process to 
his wife, and the Court found that it did not acquire juris-
diction over the corporation and that the judgment 
rendered against the corporation was void. These Utah 
cases emphasize the need for strict compliance with the 
statute involved. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court made a finding 
that Bottomley was foreman of Defendant corporation 
in charge of the property at Hop Creek. The testimony 
of Attorney El~ and Deputy :McAllister as to the agency 
of Bottomley was accepted in the face of contradictory 
testimony by ~Ir. Bottomley, ~fr. White and :Jlr. :Jiiller. 
Whether the Supreme Court is bound by the findings 
of the Trial Court in this respect will be hereafter 
discussed, but it should be emphasized that if Bottom-
ley's testimony were, in fact, true, and the process 
served upon him put in a trunk until approxnnately a 
month before the hearing on :Motion to Quash Service, 
Defendant has 1nost certainly been deprived of its 
propert~· without due process of law·. 
It ha~ been stated. generan~~~ that the person served 
with ]H'<H'C'~~ Hmst be, instead of a 1nere subordinate 
Plllplo~·pp \rithout discretion, one regularly employed, 
having sonw <'hargp or 1neasure of control oYer the busi-
n pss <'II t ru~ t Pd to hiln or of son1e feature thereof, and he 
n1ust hP of sufficient character and rank as to afford 
reasonable assurance that he will cmmnunicate to his 
comptw~· the fact that the process has been seiTed upon 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
him. Whvteh1trst v. Kerr (1910) 153 N.C. 76, 68 S.E. 
913; J. B. Blades Lumber Company v. Finance Co. of 
America (1933) 204 N.C. 285, 168 S.E. 219. There would 
seem to be little assurance, if any, that a camp cook, 
who had never completed his secondary education ( Tr. 
58) and who had never himself been involved in a legal 
proceeding, would communicate the fact of service to 
his company. 
We are aware that the Trial Court found Bottom-
ley to be foreman at Hop Creek, and if he had been such, 
perhaps the service in this case would have complied 
with the statutory requirements. But the evidence sup-
porting that finding is not sufficient to uphold it since 
it was apparently based wholly upon the alleged declara-
tion of the agent himself that he was "foreman." This 
evidence is incompetent and is the only evidence in the 
record of Bottomley being anything but a laborer, 
subject to the immediate supervision of :Mr . ..'Hiller who 
was at all times within the state of Utah and in charge 
of Hop Creek. 
As a general rule, the admissions, statements, and 
declarations of one alleged to be the agent of another, 
other than his testin1ony in the case in which the issue 
arises, are not admissible either to prove the fact of 
his agency or the extent of his authority as an agent, 
20 Am. Jur. Evidence Sec. 598, pg. 508. This rule is for 
the protection of the party whom it is sought to bind 
as principal. In other words, the agency sought to be 
established must, prima facie, be proved jndependently 
of the declaration of the alleged agent. If this require-
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ment be met, then the declarations become admissible 
in corrorboration only where they constitute a part of 
the res gestae and were made at the time of the trans-
action in question. Jameson v. B'i·rst Savings Bank & 
Trust Co., 103 ALR 1492, 40 N.l\L 133, 55 P. 2nd 743. 
While the employrnent of Bottomley by the Defend-
ant may have been established independently of Bot-
tomley's declaration, and thus, Bottomley's state1nent, 
as narrated by Ela and Deputy McAllister, may have 
been admissible to show the nature of Bottomley's 
authority, the Trial Court did more than admit the evi-
dence. It made the declaration the basis for its finding 
of the quality of agency required by the e tah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the absence of any competent 
corroborative testimony. This is the very thing the 
courts have said cannot be done. Bass r. American Pro-
dttcts Export and Import Corp., supra. 
What evidence is there in this case tending to 
establish an agency on the part of Bottomley more than 
that of mere etnployment, except his own alleged dec-
laration Y The sheriff had obtained personal knowledge 
a short time before that the superintendent of the 
property was a n1an named Henry Miller whmn he Imffi\r 
by sight. The officer of the corporation who appointed 
Bottomley e1nployed hun as a general laborer only. 
Nothing about the signs on the property or the badges 
worn hy the men identified Bottomley as foren1an or in 
charge. The evidence respecting settle1nent of certain 
<'laim~ on which suit had been brought in other actions 
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and in which actions service had allegedly been made 
on Bottomley, is hardly the type of evidence to support 
an agency in view of the fact that the corporation 
never at any time appeared in the actions and in view 
of Mr. White's uncontradicted testimony that he first 
learned of the attachment of property in one of the other 
actions in a telephone conversation with the company's 
creditor after the attachment occurred. The Trial Court's 
finding was obviously based on incompetent evidence 
or controlled or influenced by error of law, the error 
of law being a belief by the court that the alleged dec-
laration of Bottomley was sufficient alone. 
POINT II. 
ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO MAKE FINDINGS 
AND ENTER ITS ORDER QUASHING SERVICE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT COMPANY AND 
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT. 
What has been said with respect to the service 
on Bottomley of the Answer and Cross-Complaint can 
be said with respect to the service of the complaint on 
Jervis, the Denver employee, with the added observation 
that there was no testimony of alleged declarations per-
taining to that attempted service. All of the evidence 
at the hearing supported a finding that Jervis was an 
inferior employee, without any authority sufficient to 
bring him within the definition of "other agent" as re-
quired by statute. 
The Trial oCourt should have found that the service 
of the Complaint on Jervis was insufficient, and on this 
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ground, should have quashed the return of service of 
process and set aside the default entered by the Clerk 
of the Court. 
Actual notice of the pendency of the action acquired 
by corporate officers, even if this fact were shown, 
would not be sufficient to sustain a service of process 
clearly invalid under the statute in view of the strict 
compliance of the statute required by our Court. See 
Reader v. District Court, supra. 
CONCLL"SIOX 
'This case points up the dangers inherent in attempt-
ing service of process on corporations by delivery of 
the papers to inferior employees. \Y e are unable to 
estimate how many times inadequate service is actually 
allowed to pass in our courts because unchallenged by 
the corporate Defendant, but we suspect that it occurs 
quite frequently. \Yhen challenged, this type of inade-
quate service should be quashed in the interests of 
natural justice and the parties seeking to acquire juris-
diction be directed to c01nply strictly "ith the statute 
as construed In the light of the require1nents for due 
proces~. 
Hespectfully subn1itted. 
t~HEEX\YOOD ~-\.XD 8\Y~\X 
and ALLEX :Jl. S\V~\X 
Attorneys fm· Appellant 
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